Flexicurity in the European Union: Flexibility for Outsiders, Security for Insiders. by Vliet, O.P. van & Nijboer, H.
Leiden Law School  
 
Department of Economics Research Memorandum 2012.2 
 
Flexicurity in the European Union: Flexibility for 
Outsiders, Security for Insiders  
 
 
Olaf van Vliet and Henk Nijboer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 L e i d e n   U n i v e r s i t y 
 
Correspondence to 
 
Leiden Law School 
Department of Economics 
P.O. Box 9520 
2300 RA  Leiden 
The Netherlands 
Phone ++31 71 527 7756 (7855) 
Email: economie@law.leidenuniv.nl 
Website: www.economie.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Editors 
 
Prof. dr. C.L.J. Caminada 
Dr B.C.J. van Velthoven 
  
 
Flexicurity in the European Union:  
Flexibility for Outsiders, Security for Insiders ∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Olaf van Vliet and Henk Nijboer 
 
Leiden Law School, Leiden University 
Department of Economics 
Research program Reforming Social Security 
(www.hsz.leidenuniv.nl) 
P.O. Box 9520, 2300 RA  Leiden, The Netherlands 
Phone: ++ 31 71 527 7756 
E-mail: o.p.van.vliet@law.leidenuniv.nl 
E-mail: h.nijboer@law.leidenuniv.nl 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Flexicurity is at the heart of European policy debates. Its aim is to overcome the tensions be-
tween labour market flexibility on the one hand, and the provision of social security for work-
ers on the other hand. To date, there is little insight into whether flexicurity policies have 
been adopted across the European Union. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse to 
what extent labour market policies have been reformed along the lines of the flexicurity con-
cept across 18 European countries over the period 1985-2008. Focusing on the main axes of 
the flexicurity concept, new datasets are used to examine changes in employment protection 
legislation, unemployment benefits and active labour market policies. Data on the strictness 
of employment regulation indicate that reforms have been influenced by labour market insid-
ers, since the level of flexibility has been increased more for temporary employment, the la-
bour market outsiders, than for regular employment, the insiders. Although gross unemploy-
ment replacement rates suggest that unemployment benefits have become more generous, 
net replacement rates indicate that the level of income security from benefits actually has 
been decreased. Moreover, data illustrate that larger shares of European labour forces have 
temporary contracts. As such, the gap between insiders and outsiders on the labour market 
has been increased. This development is contrary to the goals of the European Commission. 
 
JEL-codes: H53, J08, J58  
Keywords: Flexicurity, insider-outsider theory, labour market policy, welfare state, political 
economy
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1. Introduction 
 
The flexicurity strategy is at the heart of the European debate about reforming social security. 
At the European Union (EU) level, the concept is integrated in the European Employment 
Strategy, which is aimed at increasing employment and reducing unemployment in EU coun-
tries. The European Employment Guidelines of 2001 already stated that flexibility and security 
should be raised simultaneously, and flexicurity was put explicitly on the agenda of the Euro-
pean Council in Brussels in 2006. In line with the Lisbon agenda, flexicurity has been pro-
posed as a promising reform concept for enhancing Europe’s economic growth and social co-
hesion (e.g. EC, 2006; EC, 2007a; EC, 2007b; Boeri e.a., 2007). On the one hand, more 
flexible labour markets would reduce the costs of firms to adjust to the dynamics of the highly 
integrated global economy, improving Europe’s competitiveness. On the other hand, increased 
labour participation and higher income security would contribute to higher levels of social in-
clusion. As such, flexicurity is also explicitly integrated in the Europe 2020 strategy and it is 
expected to contribute to the achievement of its objectives (EC, 2010). Moreover, the flexicu-
rity strategy is aimed at diminishing the segmentation of labour markets, where relatively 
protected and unprotected employees coexist.  
Following the significant attention for flexicurity in policy debates, the amount of academic 
work on this theme has also started to grow (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Boeri e.a., 2006; 
Schmid, 2006; Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). In the initial phase, the literature on flexicurity 
has been mainly conceptually and theoretically oriented. Remarkably, there is relatively little 
empirical research on flexicurity. Only recently, the first case studies on the adoption of 
flexicurity policies have been published (e.g. Bonoli and Emmenegger, 2010). Still, besides 
the typical examples of Denmark and the Netherlands, which have been extensively discussed 
in the policy documents and the conceptual literature, there is little insight into what extent 
flexicurity policies have been adopted in other European countries.   
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse to what extent labour market policies in EU 
countries have been reformed along the lines of the flexicurity concept. There is no universal 
definition of flexicurity (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009), but two central elements of the concept 
can be distilled. First, flexicurity refers to a configuration of labour market policies that aims 
to complement labour market flexibility with economic security. This static conceptualisation 
of flexicurity, as a state of the labour market, is discussed in section 2. Second, flexicurity 
refers to a strategy to reform labour market policies. Employees with permanent contracts are 
usually more protected and better organized than employees with temporary contracts. 
Therefore, the first group of employees, who are called insiders in the political economy litera-
ture, is better able to influence labour market policy reforms than the latter group, the out-
siders. Since flexicurity concerns a package of policy reforms rather than a single labour mar-
ket policy, it is proposed to overcome opposition from insiders in policy reform processes. This 
dynamic element of flexicurity will be conceptualized in section 3. In the empirical part of the 
paper, section 4, labour market policies will be compared across countries and over time. The 
recent publication of new data on labour market policies by the OECD (2012) and by Van Vliet 
and Caminada (2012) enables us to examine whether countries have started to adopt flexicu-
rity policies since the beginning of the 21
st
 century. Building on the comparative political 
economy literature on labour market policy reform, the differences in labour market policies 
concerning insiders and outsiders are analysed. Many of the labour market arrangements that 
are relevant for the flexicurity concept are regulated by sector specific collective agreements 
(Houwing, 2010). However, because the availability of data on decentralized labour market 
arrangements is too limited for the empirical approach of the paper, a comparison of 18 EU 
countries for the period 1985-2008, the analysis is focused on labour market institutions 
which are measured at the country level. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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2.  Flexicurity as a static concept: state of the labour market 
 
The main characteristic of flexicurity is that it is intended to overcome the tensions between 
labour market flexibility on the one hand, and the provision of social security for workers on 
the other hand (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). Flexible labour markets can be seen as beneficial 
for job creation, especially during periods of recovery after recessions, but they generally im-
ply lower levels of economic security. Welfare state programmes provide economic security, 
but they can have adverse effects, such as longer unemployment spells and therefore higher 
public expenditure and less mobility on the labour market. In the flexicurity concept, flexibility 
and security are viewed as complementary.   
In the literature, the term ‘flexicurity’ has been used to refer to different configurations of 
labour market policies, in which several types and degrees of flexibility (external-numerical 
and internal-numerical flexibility, functional and wage flexibility) and security (job, employ-
ment and income security) have been stressed (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Madsen, 2007; 
Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). This ambiguous nature of the concept has also been a source of 
criticism, as different interpretations and views on labour market policies are ranked under 
the concept of flexicurity (Burroni and Keune, 2011). In the often-mentioned textbook cases 
of flexicurity policies, namely those in Denmark and the Netherlands, there is variation too. 
The Danish model of flexicurity builds on the combination of flexible labour markets, generous 
unemployment benefits and a strong emphasis on activation. This combination is known as 
the ‘golden triangle’. The Dutch flexicurity model is more centred on combining non-standard 
work, such as temporary agency work and part-time work, with regular social security rights 
(Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). Because the Danish model is the most common example to il-
lustrate the concept of flexicurity in the literature and in EU employment guidelines and policy 
documents (e.g. European Commission, 2006) we focus on the labour market policies of the 
Danish type of flexicurity.  
The Danish model is a combination of three types of labour market policies. First, employment 
protection legislation (EPL) that is relatively loose provides flexibility for firms in terms of the 
hiring and firing of workers. This is compensated by a rather generous social safety net for 
the unemployed through unemployment benefits, which is the second element, income secu-
rity. Indeed, the exchange between employment protection legislation and unemployment 
benefits can be regarded as the main axis of flexicurity. Economists usually concentrate on 
the trade-off between unemployment benefits and employment protection since unemploy-
ment benefits and employment protection could be considered as substitutes (see e.g. 
Blanchard and Tirole, 2004; Blanchard and Tirole, 2008; Boeri et al., 2006).
1
 Third, flexicurity 
involves strong efforts on active labour market policies (ALMP). These policies are aimed at 
increasing labour market participation through programmes such as labour market training, 
services of employment agencies and subsidised employment. When low employment protec-
tion leads to more dismissals, the mobility on the labour market will be greater when the 
skills of the unemployed are improved by labour market training. Thus, transitions from un-
employment to employment can be made easier, leading to more employment security. As a 
result, job security is replaced by employment security, which is a central feature of the 
flexicurity concept.  
Flexicurity policies are expected to improve the functioning of European labour markets, but 
the effects of less employment protection, more generous unemployment benefits and higher 
expenditure on ALMPs are not clear. Although high levels of employment protection lead to 
slower job creation owing to higher labour costs and therefore to longer unemployment spells, 
loosening employment protection may also have some drawbacks. An economic advantage of 
employment protection is for instance that investments in firm-specific human capital are 
higher. Another advantage is that firms internalise to some extent the external effects of un-
                                                 
1  In theory, unemployment insurance and employment protection could be considered as substitutes. We 
realize that there are considerable differences in conditions, design and incentives in practice. 
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employment benefits. Hence, making firing more costly to employers reduces the layoff rate 
and unemployment incidence. Similarly, increases in the generosity of unemployment benefits 
may also have contradictory effects (Baily, 1978). On the one hand, more generous unem-
ployment benefits reduce the incentive to search for new jobs and therefore lead to higher 
unemployment levels. On the other hand, longer job searches may lead to better matches on 
the labour market and therefore to more productive economies. With respect to ALMP, there 
is a lively debate going on about the effectiveness of those programmes (Kluve, 2010; Card 
et al, 2010). Positive effects on transitions from unemployment to work have been found for 
employment services and private sector incentive programmes. However, even if ALMPs are 
effective, it is questionable whether the benefits offset the costs, such as displacement ef-
fects, lock-in effects and the tax burden. 
 
 
3. Flexicurity as a dynamic concept: a reform strategy 
 
Reforms of labour market institutions such as unemployment benefits and dismissal protec-
tion can be understood with the insider–outsider approach (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001), that 
has gained importance in the political economy literature. In this view, a labour market con-
sists of two segments. The core segment consists of insiders who are defined as incumbent 
workers who enjoy more privileges than the outsiders at the margin, the rest of the labour 
force. Although insiders can differ from outsiders in many ways, insiders can generally be 
conceptualised as employees with permanent contracts who are labour union members, 
whereas outsiders are workers with fixed-term contracts who are not represented by labour 
unions.
2
 This disparity between insiders and outsiders exists because firms incur labour turn-
over costs. These costs are the costs of hiring, firing and providing firm-specific training. It 
should be noted that the firing costs are largely determined by the rigidity of the EPL. Because 
of the labour turnover costs, employers give the insiders market power, that the insiders use 
to get wages above the market-clearing level (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). 
Insiders can be expected to object to reductions of employment protection on regular con-
tracts, because that would lead to less job security for themselves. Moreover, less employ-
ment protection could also imply that insiders have to accept lower wages owing to less bar-
gaining power in wage negotiations (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). Hence, it could be argued 
that trade unions will challenge reform proposals targeted at permanent contracts and that 
they will agree with policy-makers upon making temporary contracts more flexible instead. 
However, deregulation of the hiring of non-standard workers gives them a stronger position 
relative to standard workers in the competition for jobs. This tends to undermine insiders’ 
privileged position in terms of wages and working conditions in the long run (Eichhorst and 
Marx, 2011). Therefore, trade unions have a motivation to object to reforms of EPL concern-
ing both permanent and temporary contracts, whilst they would still prefer marginal over 
general flexibilisation (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011).  
Empirical evidence from Allan and Scruggs (2004) indicates that corporatism is positively as-
sociated with the levels of unemployment benefits. Swank (2011) examines the impact of 
corporatism on the spending on unemployment benefits as well as on unemployment re-
placement rates and he finds for both measures a positive impact of corporatism. Regarding 
ALMPs, Swank (2011) finds that political-economic institutions of (sector-) coordinated capi-
talism are positively related to ALMP expenditure. In line with these results, Van Vliet and 
Koster (2011) find a positive effect of the presence of tripartite councils on spending on 
ALMPs. With respect to EPL, Emmenegger (2011) finds that a strong labour movement is a 
                                                 
2  Within the group of insiders there is variation too. Pfann and Palm (1993) found that non-production work-
ers face better protection than production workers owing to higher hiring and firing costs for non-
production workers. Pfann (2006) shows for the Netherlands that older employees with longer tenures and 
higher wages enjoy better employment protection than other employees.   
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determinant of high levels of EPL.
3
 It is not clear, however, whether this effect stems from 
labour unions or from left-wing political parties, since the employed index comprises both. 
Rueda (2007) examined the variation in job security regulation across countries and over 
time, but he did not report a clear effect of corporatism. One explanation for these mixed re-
sults from an empirical viewpoint could be that these studies did not account for the differ-
ences in EPL regarding workers with permanent or temporary contracts. It has been well 
documented that reforms aimed at flexibilisation have regularly resulted in two-tier reforms, 
in which the employment protection for temporary contracts has been reduced, while the em-
ployment protection for permanent contracts has remained unchanged (Saint-Paul, 2004; 
Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Ochel, 2008). Since insiders are organised in trade unions that 
have direct access to political decision making, for instance in bi- or tripartite councils, they 
can challenge reform proposals. As a consequence, policy makers have opted for reforms of 
the least organised part of the labour markets.  
In contrast, flexicurity conceptualised as a strategy to reform labour market policies is sup-
posed to provide a package of policy reforms for the labour market as a whole instead of only 
targeted at the margin. Because the package consists of increasing flexibility and security 
simultaneously, lower levels of employment protection for insiders can be compensated with 
more generous unemployment benefits and higher expenditures on ALMP (EC, 2006; EC, 
2007a; EC, 2007b; Boeri e.a., 2007; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Madsen, 2007). A reform 
proposal that concerns a package of policy reforms rather than an isolated policy reform can 
be expected to overcome opposition from employees in reform processes (Eichhorst and 
Konle-Seidl, 2005). Therefore, it can be expected that if governments have adopted the flex-
icurity strategy, the strictness of the dismissal protection has been reduced, unemployment 
benefits have become more generous and expenditures on ALMP have been increased. Fur-
thermore, if labour market insiders have been compensated with more generous unemploy-
ment benefits, not only the employment protection on temporary employment but also on 
regular contracts should have become less strict. 
 
 
                                                 
3  Yet, using a fuzzy set approach to analyse the cross-country variation in EPL, Emmenegger (2011) finds 
that a strong labour movement is not a necessary condition. 
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4. A cross-country comparison  
 
Flexibility of employment protection legislation 
In this section we examine to what extent EU countries have changed their labour market 
policies in line with the flexicurity concept. Since flexicurity is a policy concept of the EU, this 
study is focused on EU member states. Subsequently, the selection of countries and years is 
guided by the availability of data. Hence, the study includes 18 member states of the EU for 
the period 1985-2008.  
For the flexibility dimension of flexicurity, the study focuses on employment protection legisla-
tion (EPL). To compare the strictness of EPL across countries and over time, the study relies 
on an EPL strictness indicator that is provided by the OECD (2009). The EPL indicator is avail-
able for different types of employment. Here, we use the EPL indicator for employees with a 
regular contract to measure the employment protection of insiders, while the EPL indicator for 
employees with a temporary contract is used to measure the protection of outsiders.
4
  
The EPL indicator for regular contracts is an index that is calculated as a weighted average of 
sub-indicators of employment regulation. The indicator covers three main areas. The first one 
is the difficulty of dismissal, referring to the legislative provisions setting conditions under 
which a dismissal is justified. The second area includes procedural inconveniences that an 
employer may face during a dismissal process. The third category includes notice and sever-
ance pay provisions. The index is normalized to a scale from 0 to 6 where a higher score indi-
cates stricter employment regulation. As such, the index is a comprehensive measure for in-
ternational comparative studies. A limitation of this indicator is that some characteristics of 
EPL may be not fully reflected. For instance, since notice periods and severance pay are not 
legally regulated in some countries, they might be provided by collective agreements or con-
tractual extensions. Because there is no detailed information about such contractual provi-
sions, the EPL index often relies on minimal requirements as provided by labour law. Another 
disadvantage is the lack of incorporation of judicial practices deviating from the minimal legal 
requirements (OECD, 2004). Despite these limitations, the index is a conventional summary 
measure to analyse a relatively large number of countries over a longer period.  
Table 1 presents the index for the strictness of EPL with regard to regular employment for 18 
EU countries for the period 1985-2008. In the 14 old member states of the EU, the average 
strictness of employment protection slightly declined between 1985 and 2008. Germany is the 
only country in which the strictness of EPL has been increased. In some countries, such as 
France and Italy, EPL has not changed at all. Only five countries, namely Austria, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, reduced the strictness of employment protection substan-
tially. However, in all of them but Finland, the level of EPL still lies above average in 2008. In 
the countries that acceded the EU in 2004, the level of employment protection has not been 
changed. Interestingly, the level of employment protection in the new member states is com-
parable to the level in the old member states. 
 
                                                 
4  The OECD provides also an overall index of EPL. This index builds on the measures for regular and tempo-
rary employment as used in this study and on a measure for the regulation with regard to collective dis-
missals. However, the measure with regard to collective dismissals does not reflect the overall strictness of 
regulation applicable to collective dismissals, but refers to additional delays and procedures which go be-
yond those applicable for individual dismissal. Hence, the measure for collective dismissals cannot be con-
sidered as a stand-alone indicator and is only useful as a sub-measure of the overall index of EPL (OECD, 
2004: 65).  
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Table 1. Strictness of employment protection legislation on regular employment 1985-2008 
 
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
change 
1985 - 2008 
Austria 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.4 -0.6 
Belgium 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.1 
Czech Republic : : 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.1           : 
Denmark 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 -0.1 
Finland 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 -0.6 
France 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 0.0 
Germany 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 0.4 
Greece 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 0.0 
Hungary : 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9           : 
Ireland 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.0 
Italy 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.0 
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.7 -0.4 
Poland : 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1           : 
Portugal 5.0 4.8 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 -0.8 
Slovak Republic : : 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.5           : 
Spain 3.9 3.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 -1.4 
Sweden 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 0.0 
UK 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.2 
        
Mean EU-18 : : 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3           : 
Mean EU-14 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 -0.2 
Mean EU-4 : : 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4           : 
 
Note: The indicator for EPL on regular employment is based on eight sub-measures: the extensiveness of 
notification procedures for dismissals, the delay involved before notice can start, the length of the no-
tice period of dismissals, the amount of severance payment, the definition of justified or unfair dis-
missal, the length of trial periods, the compensation following unfair dismissals and the possibility of 
reinstatement following unfair dismissal. 
 
EU-14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
EU-4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic.  
   
Source:  OECD Employment Database (OECD, 2009); and own calculations. 
 
 
The strictness of EPL for temporary employment is the second indicator to measure the flexi-
bility dimension of flexicurity. This indicator measures the restrictions on the hiring of tempo-
rary employment by firms. It builds on a number of sub-measures (see the note under Table 
2) with respect to the regulation on fixed-term contracts and temporary work agencies. Again, 
the index is normalised to a scale from 0 to 6 and a higher score indicates stricter regulation. 
The developments in the strictness of EPL on temporary employment are reported in Table 2. 
These data indicate that the average level of EPL stringency declined relatively sharply in the 
period 1985-2008 in the old EU member states, especially since the beginning of the 1990s. 
In contrast to the trends in the strictness of EPL on regular employment as presented above, 
most countries have reduced the strictness of EPL on temporary employment. This indicates 
that governments have mainly opted for changes at the margins of the labour market in order 
to increase flexibility. The sharpest decline in the strictness of the regulation of temporary 
employment can be observed in Italy, indicating the deregulation of part-time employment 
and the introduction of a new type of fixed-term contracts (OECD, 2004). The sharp decline in 
the indicator for the Netherlands reflects the adoption of the ‘flexibility and security’ law that 
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increased the maximum number of successive fixed-term contracts and lengthened the maxi-
mum total duration of contracts with temporary work agencies (OECD, 2004). Another inter-
esting case is France. Although the French level of EPL on temporary employment was already 
above average in 1985, it has been increased even further in the following years. This implies 
that the French labour market policies have not become more flexible at all, since the EPL on 
regular employment remained constant. Remarkably, the level of EPL on temporary employ-
ment has increased in three of the four new member states included. It only declined in the 
Slovak Republic. The average level is lower in the new member states than in the old member 
states, which implies that there seems to be some convergence between the old and new 
member states. 
 
 
Table 2. Strictness of employment protection legislation on temporary employment 1985-
2008 
 
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
change 
1985 - 2008 
Austria 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 
Belgium 4.6 4.6 4.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 -2.0 
Czech Republic : : 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9             : 
Denmark 3.1 3.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 -1.8 
Finland 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 -0.1 
France 3.1 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 0.6 
Germany 3.8 3.8 3.5 2.0 1.3 1.3 -2.5 
Greece 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 3.1 3.1 -1.6 
Hungary : 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.4             : 
Ireland 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.4 
Italy 5.4 5.4 5.4 3.3 1.9 2.0 -3.4 
Netherlands 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 -1.2 
Poland : 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.8 1.8            : 
Portugal 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.1 -1.3 
Slovak Republic : : 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.4            : 
Spain 3.8 3.8 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 -0.3 
Sweden 4.1 4.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 0.9 -3.2 
UK 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.1 
        
Mean EU-18 : : 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.7            : 
Mean EU-14 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.9 -1.2 
Mean EU-4 : : 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1            : 
 
Note:  The indicator for EPL on temporary employment is based on six sub-measures: valid cases for the use 
of fixed-term contracts, the maximum number of successive fixed-term contracts, the maximum cu-
mulated duration of successive fixed-term contracts, the types of work for which temporary work 
agency employment is legal, restrictions on the number of renewals and the maximum cumulated du-
ration of temporary work agency contracts.       
 
EU-14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
EU-4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic.  
   
Source: OECD Employment Database (OECD, 2009); and own calculations. 
 
 
Income security from unemployment benefits 
Following conventions in the field (Cornelisse and Goudswaard, 2002; Caminada e.a., 2010; 
Swank, 2011), replacement rates of unemployment benefits are used to measure the level of 
income security. Naturally, not only the level, but also the duration of entitlement rights is 
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relevant to indicate the generosity of unemployment benefits. However, because of the lim-
ited data availability, the duration is not included in this study. Earlier research shows that 
most countries had not changed the duration of entitlement rights in the period 1995-2002 
(Van Vliet, 2010). For gross unemployment replacement rates the study relies on OECD 
(2010b) data. This measure indicates the level of gross unemployment benefits as percentage 
of previous gross income from work. The replacement rate is calculated as an unweighted 
average of benefit payments in various situations of previous income, unemployment spells 
and household types.  
Table 3 shows that gross unemployment benefits increased on average by 2.9 percentage 
points in the 14 old member states of the EU between 1985 and 2007. The increase was even 
larger in the first half of this period, but some countries reduced the benefit level after 2001. 
The generosity of replacement rates in the new member sates is lower than in the old mem-
ber states. This partly causes the decline in the mean of the 18 EU countries from 2001 on-
wards. The increase in the benefit level in the old member states indicates that income secu-
rity has increased, which is in line with the concept of flexicurity. Especially the Southern wel-
fare states Greece, Italy and Portugal, with rather low levels of replacement rates in 1985, 
caught up rapidly. As was the case with EPL for temporary employment, France shows a 
strong increase in the level of unemployment benefits. The sharpest decline in the level of 
unemployment benefits was in the Netherlands, owing to reforms of the unemployment bene-
fit schemes. 
 
 
Table 3. Gross replacement rates unemployment benefits 1985-2007 
 
1985 1991 1995 2001 2005 2007 
change  
1985 - 2007 
Austria 29.4 31.2 32.5 31.5 31.9 31.6 2.3 
Belgium 43.1 41.6 38.7 38.5 40.9 40.0 -3.1 
Czech Republic : : : 5.9 6.2 6.3           : 
Denmark 53.1 51.9 64.9 50.9 50.5 47.7 -5.4 
Finland 34.4 38.8 35.8 34.9 35.2 34.1 -0.3 
France 34.4 37.6 37.4 43.5 39.0 39.0 4.6 
Germany 28.3 28.8 26.3 29.4 24.2 23.7 -4.6 
Greece 7.1 12.7 14.7 13.3 12.9 12.6 5.5 
Hungary : : : 12.9 12.6 13.3           : 
Ireland 28.3 29.3 26.3 29.7 33.7 37.2 9.0 
Italy 0.4 2.5 19.3 34.1 32.5 31.7 31.3 
Netherlands 54.6 53.2 52.3 52.9 35.3 33.9 -20.7 
Poland : : : 11.5 11.5 10.2           : 
Portugal 21.7 34.4 35.4 41.3 39.5 43.4 21.7 
Slovak Republic : : : 11.7 8.3 8.3           : 
Spain 34.4 33.5 39.0 36.5 36.0 35.9 1.5 
Sweden 27.9 29.4 26.9 36.9 38.8 32.4 4.4 
UK 20.7 17.8 17.8 16.6 15.6 15.2 -5.5 
        
Mean EU-18 : : : 29.5 28.0 27.6           : 
Mean EU-14 29.8 31.6 33.4 35.0 33.3 32.8 2.9 
Mean EU-4 : : : 10.5 9.6 9.5           : 
 
Note:  Replacement rates are calculated as unweighted averages of several situations in which benefits are 
estimated for three durations of unemployment spells (1, 2 to 3, 4 to 5 years of unemployment), three 
family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work), two earning levels (average 
earnings and two-thirds of average earnings of an average production worker). 
EU-14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
EU-4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic.  
 
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models (OECD, 2010); and own calculations. 
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Despite the fact that the gross unemployment replacement is a conventional measure in the 
comparative welfare state literature, it can only be seen as a limited indicator of the generos-
ity of benefit systems for unemployed people (Whiteford, 1995). First, because of differences 
in taxation of unemployment benefits, gross replacement rates are difficult to compare across 
countries. Second, gross replacement rates only represent unemployment benefits instead of 
all the benefits unemployed people are entitled to, such as family benefits. Therefore, we also 
use an indicator that takes these shortcomings into account: the net unemployment replace-
ment rate, taken from Van Vliet and Caminada (2012) who updated Scruggs’ (2005) Welfare 
State Entitlements Data Set. The net unemployment replacement rate is the ratio of the net 
income from unemployment benefits to the net income from work. The measure indicates the 
generosity of unemployment benefits in the initial phase of unemployment and it is based on 
the wage level of an average production worker.
5
 Here, we employ the unweighted average of 
the replacement rates of two household situations, namely single persons and one earner 
couples with two children.  
Net unemployment replacement rates are presented in Table 4. These data indicate that the 
net level of unemployment benefits has been decreased in most of the European countries. 
Interestingly, this trend is neither in line with the increase of the generosity of the gross un-
employment benefits, nor with the concept of flexicurity. Only in Italy the net replacement 
rates increased substantially. In line with the stricter EPL and the higher gross benefits, also 
the net benefit level has been increased in France. In Ireland, the net replacement rate is 
lower in 2008 than in 1985, but from 2000 onwards, the benefit level has been increased.  
Furthermore, the levels of the net replacement rates are obviously higher than the levels of 
the gross replacement rates, which indicates that income taxes are lower and other social 
benefits are more generous for the unemployed. However, it should be noted that the differ-
ence between gross and net can also be partly explained by the fact that the net replacement 
rates only refer to the first year of unemployment, whereas the gross replacement rates refer 
to a five year unemployment spell. In most countries, the level of unemployment benefits 
decreases when unemployment spells are longer. 
                                                 
5  The OECD has made a fundamental change in the approach of the average wages. The classical approach 
of calculating the average wage was based on the average wage of a production worker (APW), which re-
fers to the wage level in the manufacturing industry. The new concept for the average wage refers to the 
average worker wage (AW), which includes much more sectors. The differences in the levels of the APW 
and the AW can be significant for individual countries. The transition from APW to AW started in 2005 and 
the AW is available from 2000 onwards. The APW data is available for all years up to 2005 and for the year 
2007. Hence, there is no consistent time series for the period 1985-2008. In order to have a consistent re-
placement rate time series, Van Vliet and Caminada (2012) estimated the APW for the years 2006 and 
2008 based on the growth rate of the AW.   
  
- 10 - 
Table 4. Net replacement rates unemployment benefits 1985 - 2008 
 
 
Note:  Replacement rates are calculated as unweighted averages of benefits for two family situations (single 
person and one earner couple with two children), for an unemployment spell of 1 year and for the av-
erage production worker wage.  
 a: The value for Greece in 1990 is calculated as the average of the values in 1989 and 1991. 
  
EU-14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
EU-4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic.  
   
Source: Unemployment replacement rates dataset (Van Vliet and Caminada, 2012); and own calculations. 
 
 
Employment security from active labour market policies 
To compare the developments in employment security policies across countries, the study 
relies on expenditures on ALMPs. The main programmes included are public employment ser-
vice, labour market training, job rotation, employment incentives, supported employment, 
direct job creation and start-up incentives. We use a measure that expresses ALMP expendi-
tures as a share of expenditures on all labour market policies (LMPs), defined as the sum of 
spending on activation policies and on unemployment benefits. This measure indicates gov-
ernments’ emphasis on activation policies relative to all labour market policies. Furthermore, 
since both the nominator and the denominator of the indicator are related to the unemploy-
ment rate, the effect of the unemployment rate on the expenditure measure as a whole is 
cancelled out. For this measure, data are taken from the OECD (2012).  
Table 5 presents the expenditures on ALMPs as a share of expenditures on all LMPs. Between 
1990 (the first data year for which the observations of the old member states are complete) 
and 2007, the expenditures on ALMPs as a share of total LMP spending have been increased. 
This trend indicates that the financial efforts of the governments of the old member states on 
employment security have been increased, which is in line with the concept of flexicurity.
6
 
                                                 
6  In other studies (for instance Van Vliet and Koster, 2011) it has been shown that for many countries the 
trends in different ALMP expenditure measures, for instance ALMP expenditures per unemployed relative to 
GDP per capita, are rather comparable.  
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
change  
1985 - 2008 
Austria 65.0 64.9 64.8 63.9 61.5 61.3 -3.7 
Belgium 68.6 62.2 62.8 60.9 60.3 58.7 -9.9 
Czech Republic : : 48.7 47.3 47.0 48.8             : 
Denmark 75.7 70.2 66.7 63.8 60.4 57.9 -17.7 
Finland 69.2 68.0 68.6 62.5 61.1 58.0 -11.2 
France 67.6 66.7 68.1 70.5 69.5 70.0 2.4 
Germany 66.5 66.4 64.4 65.6 65.7 65.6 -0.9 
Greece 38.4 35.1
a 36.6 36.8 38.8 41.6 3.2 
Hungary : 76.2 64.8 47.2 44.6 41.5            : 
Ireland 62.0 49.3 49.7 39.1 45.9 47.9 -14.1 
Italy 8.4 24.3 31.0 45.4 56.6 68.2 59.8 
Netherlands 86.9 76.0 76.0 76.2 71.0 70.1 -16.8 
Poland : : 41.0 32.5 32.7 25.9            : 
Portugal 78.3 77.2 78.2 79.3 76.4 76.4 -1.9 
Slovak Republic 82.0 80.1 61.9 62.0 60.4 59.3 -22.7 
Spain : : 63.8 55.0 61.0 61.3            : 
Sweden 82.2 82.9 81.0 69.7 73.9 64.3 -17.9 
UK 34.9 27.9 29.6 36.6 34.6 33.8 -1.0 
        
Mean EU-18 : : 58.8 56.4 56.7 56.1            :   
Mean EU-14 63.3 60.8 60.0 59.5 59.7 59.5 -3.7 
Mean EU-4 : : 54.6 45.5 46.3 44.4            : 
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These increases in ALMP expenditures can be observed across all welfare state types, such as 
for instance Austria, Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom. However, in all of the consid-
ered new member states except the Czech Republic, the efforts of governments on activation 
have been decreased between 1995 and 2007.  
 
 
Table 5. ALMP expenditures as share of LMP expenditures 1985 - 2007  
 
 
Note:  Expenditures on labour market policies (LMP) consist of expenditures on passive labour market policies 
(unemployment benefits) and active labour market policies (ALMP). ALMP expenditures include expen-
ditures on public employment service and administration, labour market training, job rotation and job 
sharing, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and 
start-up incentives.  
 
EU-14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
EU-4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic.  
   
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD, 2012); and own calculations. 
 
 
Flexicurity reforms 
The data provide insight into the changes in three dimensions of flexicurity policies in the EU. 
The developments in the EPL measures and the gross unemployment replacement rates seem 
to indicate that at least four countries changed their labour market policies into the direction 
of flexicurity, namely Austria, Finland, Italy, and Spain. In these countries, the expenditures 
on ALMP and the gross unemployment benefits have been increased and one of the two EPL 
measures shows a decline in strictness while the other EPL measure stays at least constant or 
has been decreased too. However, the net replacement rates have become lower in most of 
these countries, meaning that increases in unemployment benefits have not been applied to 
compensate the reductions in employment protection for the insiders. This is for instance the 
case for Austria. At first sight, the data suggest that Austria is a textbook example of the 
flexicurity strategy. EPL for regular employment has been loosened, compensated with higher 
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
change  
1995 - 2007 
Austria 23.4 25.8 22.7 35.6 35.5 42.4 19.7 
Belgium 26.4 27.5 27.3 29.1 24.9 28.1 0.9 
Czech Republic : : 26.3 24.2 28.9 30.3 4.0 
Denmark : 15.1 30.1 38.6 35.9 40.4 10.3 
Finland 36.1 43.7 26.5 28.9 31.1 35.9 9.4 
France 20.5 30.2 42.4 45.0 34.4 39.9 -2.5 
Germany 34.3 50.3 43.5 48.0 32.2 34.3 -9.2 
Greece 33.0 31.5 49.4 37.4 14.4 27.2 -22.2 
Hungary : : 31.9 35.9 34.7 31.7 -0.1 
Ireland 24.0 38.6 42.6 50.8 41.9 39.6 -3.1 
Italy : 27.8 27.8 58.6 53.9 50.7 22.8 
Netherlands 28.3 33.5 32.5 53.8 45.2 48.6 16.1 
Poland : 97.5 18.9 22.6 44.2 61.5 42.6 
Portugal : 60.5 34.6 48.8 36.3 34.0 -0.6 
Slovak Republic : : 63.6 32.5 54.7 37.5 -26.1 
Spain 10.7 19.8 11.9 28.6 24.6 25.6 13.7 
Sweden 70.6 65.5 48.9 55.8 51.8 62.2 13.4 
UK 25.3 43.7 32.1 42.6 63.4 60.9 28.8 
        
Mean EU-18 : : 34.1 39.8 38.2 40.6 6.5 
Mean EU-14 : 36.7 33.7 43.0 37.5 40.7 7.0 
Mean EU-4 : : 35.2 28.8 40.6 40.3 5.1 
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gross unemployment benefits and ALMP expenditure. However, the net replacement rates 
indicate that the unemployment benefits have in fact become less generous. This raises the 
question why the reform of the Austrian EPL has actually been successful, since it is unlikely 
that employees accept lower unemployment benefits and more flexible EPL in exchange for 
higher ALMP expenditure. In 2002, a new severance pay law was adopted. The new law re-
placed a conventional severance payments system with an individual and portable savings 
accounts system that is funded by employers via a monthly payment. In the case of dis-
missal, an employee has the choice of either receiving severance payment drawn from his 
savings account or taking his accumulated balance to the next job. At retirement, the em-
ployee can get a cash payment or convert his entitlements into an annuity (Hofer, 2007: 41). 
The reform is based on a compromise between the social partners. For employers the advan-
tage of the new system is that there is no uncertainty regarding the costs of dismissal, which 
are lower than in the old system, because they are known at the time of hiring. For employ-
ees, job mobility costs are lower because they do not lose their entitlement to severance 
payment when quitting a job, as was the case in the old system (Hofer, 2007: 46). Interest-
ingly, by reforming EPL rather than plainly reducing dismissal protection, the social partners 
were able to come up with a proposal to enhance external flexibility that was acceptable for 
the insiders.    
The Danish policies are interesting as well, since these are often mentioned as a typical ex-
ample of flexicurity. Indeed, the strictness of EPL on regular employment has been below the 
mean level during the whole period and the unemployment benefits system is one of the most 
generous systems in the EU. However, this configuration of complementary labour market 
policies has emerged in the course of quite a long period, rather than being the result of an 
explicit reform strategy to increase flexibility and security simultaneously that was designed 
on the drawing board (Burroni and Keune, 2011). Moreover, as the data show, the direction 
of the policy changes is not in line with the principles of the flexicurity concept, as the unem-
ployment benefits have become less generous and the flexibility of the labour market was 
only slightly extended, holding the protection of regular employment unchanged. However, 
the efforts on active labour market policies have actually been increased in Denmark, which is 
in line with the flexicurity concept.  
Interestingly, the results indicate further that most countries have opted for a reduction of the 
EPL on temporary employment instead of changing the protection of regular employment. In 
seven countries – Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden – 
employment protection has been reduced for temporary workers, while it remained constant 
for regular workers. In Germany, the employment protection for regular workers has even 
increased. This disparity between the reforms of regulation of regular and temporary em-
ployment contracts indicates that governments have applied two tier reforms rather than the 
flexicurity strategy, which may be owing to the influence of insiders. In Italy for instance, 
labour law reforms included the deregulation of part-time employment and the introduction of 
project-based contracts, a new type of fixed-term contracts. These changes at the margins of 
the labour market are the result of the fact that the trade unions have successfully challenged 
attempts to introduce more flexibility for insiders, whereas outsiders were not represented in 
the negotiations between employers and trade unions (Bonoli and Emmenegger, 2010).  
 
Dualisation of labour markets 
The data presented above indicate that the difference in employment protection between reg-
ular and temporary employment has been increased in Europe. However, the magnitude of 
the inequality between insiders and outsiders on the labour market in terms of employment 
protection also depends on the relative size of the group of employees with temporary con-
tracts. When more and more employees have a regular open-ended contract, deregulation of 
temporary employment would not necessarily imply more inequality on the labour market as 
a whole. Table 6 presents the development of the number of employees with a temporary 
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contract as a percentage of all employees, based on data from the Eurostat Labour Force Sur-
vey (Eurostat 2010). There is considerable variation across the countries. In 2008, for in-
stance, 29.3 percent of the Spanish employees worked on a temporary contract, while this 
was only 4.5 percent in the United Kingdom. In three of the four new member states, the 
share of temporary employees is lower than the average level of the old member states. The 
exception is Poland, that is with 26.9 percent the second highest of the whole country group. 
More important, the table shows that the share of temporary employees has increased in the 
EU countries. Among the old member states, the sharpest increase can be observed in the 
Netherlands, from 10.8 percent in 1995 to 17.9 percent in 2008. This is probably partly due 
to the fact that the EPL on temporary contracts has been reduced more than the EPL on open-
ended contracts. On average, the share of temporary employees rose by almost two percent-
age points in the old member states between 1995 (the first data year for which the observa-
tions of the old member states are complete) and 2008. This implies that, combined with the 
above presented trend in the EPL on temporary employment, there are more employees with 
a temporary contract enjoying less protection. 
 
 
Table 6. Employees with a temporary contract as percentage of total employees 1985-2008 
 
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
change  
1995 - 2008 
Austria : : 6.0 8.0 9.1 9.0 3.0 
Belgium 6.9 5.3 5.3 9.0 8.8 8.3 3.0 
Czech Republic : : : 7.2 7.9 7.2           : 
Denmark 12.3 10.8 12.1 10.2 9.8 8.3 -3.8 
Finland : : 16.5 17.7 16.5 14.9 -1.6 
France 4.7 10.6 12.2 15.4 14.1 14.1 1.9 
Germany 10.0 10.5 10.4 12.8 14.2 14.7 4.3 
Greece 21.1 16.5 10.2 13.8 11.8 11.5 1.3 
Hungary : : : 6.8 7.0 7.8           : 
Ireland 7.3 8.5 10.2 5.3 3.7 8.4 -1.8 
Italy 4.7 5.2 7.2 10.1 12.3 13.3 6.1 
Netherlands 7.5 7.6 10.8 13.8 15.4 17.9 7.1 
Poland : : : 5.6 25.6 26.9           : 
Portugal : 18.4 10.1 19.8 19.5 22.9 12.8 
Spain : 29.9 35.0 32.4 33.4 29.3 -5.7 
Slovak Republic : : : 4.0 4.9 4.5           : 
Sweden : : 13.0 14.3 15.7 15.8 2.8 
United Kingdom 6.9 5.1 6.9 6.6 5.7 5.3 -1.6 
        
Mean EU-18 : : : 11.8 13.1 13.3           : 
Mean EU-14 : : 11.9 13.5 13.6 13.8 2.0 
Mean EU-4 : : : 5.9 11.4 11.6           : 
 
Note:  EU-14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
EU-4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic.  
 
Source:  Eurostat Labour Force Survey (Eurostat, 2010); and own calculations. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The concept of flexicurity has gained importance in the European policy debates since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. In contrast, the presented data show that the labour 
market policies across the EU have not been reformed along the lines of the flexicurity con-
cept. The strictness of employment protection has been decreased on average between 1985 
and 2008, but the disparity between insiders and outsiders has actually become larger. The 
data show that most countries have increased labour market flexibility by reducing employ-
ment protection on temporary employment more than employment protection on regular 
open-ended contracts. In addition, since firms have hired relatively more temporary employ-
ees, larger shares of European labour forces have a temporary contract. The inequality be-
tween insiders and outsiders on the labour market has been illustrated by the consequences 
of the financial crisis around 2009. When firms started to reduce their production capacity in 
reaction to the recession, the temporary employees were the first to be dismissed. As a re-
sult, the rising unemployment figures across the EU are overrepresented by former temporary 
employees (OECD, 2010a).  
Furthermore, whereas most of the existing literature on labour market institutions is mainly 
focused on West European countries, this study also includes a number of Central and East 
European countries. Interestingly, the levels of protection on regular employment in the new 
EU member states are comparable to the protection levels in the old member states. This is 
remarkable, since labour market and social policies in the new member states usually differ 
strongly from the old member states (Draxler and Van Vliet, 2010). Naturally, these observa-
tions should be interpreted with caution, since only four new member states are included.  
The differences in the reforms of employment protection on temporary and permanent con-
tracts are probably owing to the role of insiders in policy making processes. Responding to 
pressure from internationalisation and labour market performance, governments have at-
tempted to introduce elements of flexibility. Since trade unions have successfully challenged 
such attempts, governments have opted for reforms at the margins of the labour market. Yet, 
the flexicurity strategy is aimed at providing reform packages that could compensate the re-
duced employment protection of insiders. A tentative explanation for the limited success of 
this strategy is that the second element of the flexicurity concept, an increase in income secu-
rity, has not been implemented either. The developments in the gross unemployment re-
placement rates suggest that unemployment benefits have become more generous, whilst the 
net replacement rates indicate that when taxes and other benefit schemes are taken into ac-
count, the income security for the unemployed has actually been decreased. Consequently, 
insiders have not been compensated sufficiently for reductions in dismissal protection, even 
though the expenditures on ALMPs have been increased. 
Hitherto, flexicurity has not been a very effective strategy to reform labour market policies. 
However, it looks as if other reform trajectories are taking place instead. They proceed mostly 
incrementally and they may vary across countries, but in the end, the outcomes could be 
comparable to the aims of the flexicurity strategy. When asymmetrical labour market reforms 
lead to the situation that the share of temporary employees grows because they become 
more attractive for firms, the position of insiders tends to be undermined. Hence, reforms at 
the margin could trigger wage competition between labour market segments, resulting in 
greater general flexibility. In Germany for example, trade unions responded to the threat of 
being crowded out by advocating more internal flexibility (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011: 85). 
Another result of the growth of non-standard jobs could be that outsiders get better organized 
in new labour unions. These unions will claim stronger positions in central confederations and 
in tripartite institutions. New constellations in the industrial relations lead to other labour 
market policy reforms, resulting in smaller differences in employment protection between 
regular and temporary employment. In addition, larger fractions of the workforce consisting of 
temporary employees may also have political consequences. When the composition of the 
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electorate changes, the attitude of the electorate towards more flexible employment regula-
tion may become more positive which makes it more likely that politicians will adopt reforms 
(Saint-Paul, 2004). Political support for reforming EPL on permanent contracts could be ex-
pected in countries with many temporary contracts, such as Spain and Poland. 
In summary, European labour market policy reforms are generally not in line with the flexicu-
rity concept but haven been focused at the margins. These two-tier reforms and the growing 
number of temporary employees could enhance more general labour market flexibility in the 
long run, but they imply larger gaps between insiders and outsiders in the short run. This 
increased inequality between insiders and outsiders is contrary to the goals of the European 
Commission. Yet, the Austrian case illustrates that attempts to introduce more flexibility 
which entail reforming rather than simply reducing employment protection can be successful 
in the short run too. 
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